Daily Shaarli

All links of one day in a single page.

February 15, 2020

Deirdre Connolly¹ sur Twitter : "Now in @CryptoVillage, snooping Telegram messages. 🕵️‍♀️ #DEFCON" / Twitter
What is “Island”
Russian Censorship of Telegram - Schneier on Security
Calls for backdoor access to WhatsApp as Five Eyes nations meet | World news | The Guardian

Countries focus on increasingly effective encryption of communications

Amazon’s new one-tap ratings could help the fake review problem - Vox

The company’s new one-tap star rating feature seeks to get more customer feedback ... from actual customers.

Telegram Bug ‘Exploited’ By Chinese Agencies, Hong Kong Activists Claim
Shelter | F-Droid - Free and Open Source Android App Repository

© 2010-2019 F-Droid Limited and Contributors

More on Backdooring (or Not) WhatsApp - Schneier on Security
A reminder, because this sometimes surprises people, and feel free to correct me... | Hacker News

A reminder, because this sometimes surprises people, and feel free to correct me if the facts have changed recently:

Telegram supports end-to-end encryption only in 1:1 private chats.

End-to-end encryption is disabled by default.

Telegram does not support end-to-end encryption, at all for group chats, its most popular use case.

Instead, Telegram claims that those group chats are "encrypted" by dint of the TLS connection between Telegram clients and the Telegram servers, which can, in this model, read all group traffic.

People like to dunk on the weirdness of the limited E2E crypto Telegram does have; it's archaic and idiosyncratic and people have published research results about it, though none to my understanding are of real practical impact. I support people dunking on bad crypto. But that has nothing to do with why Telegram is an inferior secure messenger.

By comparison, Signal, which Durov has repeatedly talked down:

  • has modern, ratchet-based forward secure end-to-end crypto, always, in both group and private messaging;

  • won the Levchin Prize, refereed by some of best-known names in academic cryptography, for the design and implementation of that cryptosystem, as well as for its implementation at WhatsApp;

  • ha repeatedly foregone basic messaging app features simply to avoid collecting user metadata; Signal didn't even have user profiles until they could figure out a way to implement it in a privacy-preserving manner, and even their GIF sharing feature has a purpose-built anonymity system; we'll only this year potentially get usernames instead of phone numbers because it took that long to design a trustworthy social graph that didn't leave Signal with a giant pile of subpoenable metadata.

Use whatever messaging app you want.